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Abstract
Advances in electronics and wireless communication technologies have enabled the de-
velopment of large-scale wireless sensor networks (WSNs). There is numerous applications
for wireless sensor networks, and security is vital for many of them. However, WSNs suﬀer
from many constraints, including low computation capability, small memory, limited en-
ergy resources, susceptibility to physical capture, the lack of infrastructure, which impose
unique security challenges and make innovative approaches desirable. In this paper we
present a survey of security issues in WSNs, address the state of the art in research on
sensor network security, and discuss some future directions for research.
1 Introduction
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are innovative large-scale wireless networks that consist
of distributed, autonomous, low-power, low-cost, small-size devices using sensors to cooper-
atively collect information through infrastructureless ad-hoc wireless network. The develop-
ment of wireless sensor networks was originally motivated by military applications such as
battleﬁeld surveillance. However, wireless sensor networks are now used in many civilian ap-
plication areas, including environment and habitat monitoring, healthcare applications, home
automation, and traﬃc control.
Security plays a fundamental role in many wireless sensor network applications. Because
sensor networks pose unique challenges, security techniques used in conventional networks
cannot be directly applied to WSNs because of its unique characteristics. First, sensor nodes
are very sensitive of production cost since sensor networks consist of a large number of sen-
sor nodes. Akyildiz et al. [2] argued that the cost of a sensor node should be much less
than one dollar in order for sensor networks to be feasible. Therefore, most sensor nodes are
resource restrained in terms of energy, memory, computation, and communication capabili-
ties. Normally sensor nodes are powered by batteries, and recharging batteries are infeasible
in many circumstances. Energy consumption becomes a key consideration for most sensor
network protocols. Second, Sensor nodes may be deployed in public hostile locations, which
make sensor nodes vulnerable to physical attacks by adversaries. Generally, adversaries are
assumed to be able to undetectably take control of a sensor node and extract all secret data
in the node. Furthermore, the scale of sensor networks is considerably large, and the network
topology is dynamically adjusted, because some nodes may die out of running out of energy
or failure, and new nodes may join the network to maintain desirable functionality. At last,sensor networks use insecure wireless communication channel and lack infrastructure. As a
result, existing security mechanisms are inadequate, and new approaches are desired.
1.1 Security Goals
Wireless sensor networks are vulnerable to many attacks because of broadcast nature of
transmission medium, resource limitation on sensor nodes and uncontrolled environments
where they are left unattended. Similar to other communication systems, WSNs have the
following general security goals:
- Conﬁdentiality: protecting secret information from unauthorized entities
- Integrity: ensuring message has not been altered by malicious nodes
- Data Origin Authentication: authenticating the source of message;
- Entity Authentication: authenticating the user/node/base-station is indeed the entity
whom it claims to be
- Access control: restricting access to resources to privileged entities
- Availability: ensuring desired service may be available whenever required
In addition, WSNs have following speciﬁc security objects:
- Forward secrecy: preventing a node from decrypting any future secret messages after it
leaves the network
- Backward secrecy: preventing a joining node from decrypting any previously transmitted
secret message
- Survivability: providing a certain level of service in the presence of failures and/or
attacks
- Freshness: ensuring that the data is recent and no adversary can replay old messages
- Scalability: supporting a great number of nodes
- Eﬃciency: storage, processing and communication limitations on sensor nodes must be
considered
1.2 Applications
There are extensive applications of wireless sensor networks [4, 34, 14], such as Great Duck
(bird observation on Great Duck island), Cattle Herding, Bathymetry, ZebraNet, Glacier
Monitoring, Ocean Water Monitoring, Cold Chain Management, Grape monitoring, Rescue
of Avalanche Victims, Vital Sign Monitoring, Power monitoring, Parts Assembly, Tracking
Military Vehicles, and Self-healing Mine Field and Sniper Localization. According to areas
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ronmental, industrial, location oriented, public safety oriented, automotive, airport oriented,
agricultural, emergency handling, medical and oceanic.
Military and medical solutions are two of the most security-oriented application ﬁelds
of wireless sensor networks. Military sensing networks are designed to detect and gain as
much information as possible about enemy movements, explosions, and other phenomena.
Typically, wireless sensor nodes are integrated with military command, control, communica-
tions, computing, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting systems. Examples
of military wireless sensor network applications are battleﬁeld surveillance, guidance systems
for intelligent missiles, detection of attacks by weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear,
biological, or chemical, and other monitoring applications. Due to the nature of the military,
it is apparent that those applications could not be mounted without appropriate security
assurance.
Recently, many medical systems are equipped with a large number of tiny, non-invasive
sensors, located on or close to the patient’s body, for health monitoring purposes. Such sys-
tems are being designed to measure diverse physiological values including Blood Pressure,
Electrocardiogram, Blood Oxygen level, activity recognition, etc., and are available in many
diﬀerent forms, including wrist wearable, ambulatory devices and as part of biomedical smart
clothes. The term of body sensor network (BSN) [73] is conied to represent this kind of ap-
plications. A number of intelligent physiological sensors is integrated into a wearable wireless
body sensor network, which can be used for computer assisted rehabilitation and even early
detection of medical conditions. Such applications imply that outpatients can be monitored
from their homes, freeing space in hospital beds. As physiological patient data is legally
required to be kept private, the implemented network must invoke a strong security protocol.
1.3 Network Models
Typically, a wireless sensor network consists of a few base stations and hundreds and thou-
sands of sensor nodes. Sensor nodes are battery powered, equipped with sensors, data pro-
cessing units of limited computation capability, limited memory space, and short-range radio
communications. Base stations are the gateways to other networks, with powerful data pro-
cessing/storage centers, or access points for human interface. In general, base stations are
many orders of magnitude more powerful than sensor nodes. As a rule, base stations are as-
sumed to be trusted and to be temper resistant. Sensor nodes are usually deployed at random
in targeted ﬁelds. Each of these scattered sensor nodes has the capabilities to collect data
and route data back to base station via infrastructureless wireless architecture. Base stations
issue task commands, collect sensor readings, perform costly operations on behalf of sensor
nodes and manage the network. WSNs are dynamic in the sense that radio range and network
connectivity changes by time. Sensor nodes dies and new sensor nodes may be added to the
network.
There are diﬀerent settings about WSN architectures.
• Hierarchical Model vs. Distributed Model
In some scenarios, sensor nodes are organized as hierarchical structure. They are
grouped into a number of clusters controlled by part of nodes playing a particular role
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multi-hop link and these member nodes performs sensing and forwarding. After gather-
ing or aggregating localized sensing information from their cluster members nodes, the
cluster heads send packets to the base station. In contrast, there is no concept of cluster
or group in distributed mode. All nodes play the same roles in the network. Once nodes
are deployed, they scan their radio coverage area to ﬁgure out neighbors and manage
to form fully distributed networks. Nodes collaborate to collect, aggregate and forward
information.
• Homogeneous Model vs. Heterogeneous Model
In homogeneous system model, all nodes are similar in terms of communication, com-
putation, and storage capabilities. By contrast, heterogeneous wireless nodes can be
equipped with diﬀerent transport medium with diﬀerent range of coverage and diﬀerent
speciﬁcations including CPU, memory, and peripherals to meet speciﬁc needs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss various key
distribution schemes. Section 3 describes attacks and countermeasures, intrusion detection
and intrusion tolerance. Section 4 presents a number of authentication protocols. In Section
5, we introduce secure data aggregation protocols. And we address some privacy-protection
protocols in Section 6. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section 7.
2 Key Distribution and Management
Security of large scale densely deployed and infrastructure-less wireless networks of resource
limited sensor nodes calls for eﬃcient key distribution and management mechanisms. This is
one of the most popular research ﬁelds in the secure sensor networks, and plenty of approaches
are proposed.
2.1 Straightforward Approaches
The simplest method of key distribution is to preload a single network-wide key into all nodes
before deployment. Only one single key is stored in the nodes’ memory and once deployed in
the network, there is no need for a node to perform key discovery or key exchange since all
the nodes in communication range can transfer messages using the key which they already
share. On the other hand, this scheme suﬀers a severe drawback that compromise of a single
node would cause compromise of the entire network through the shared key. Thus it fails in
providing the basic secure requirement of a sensor network by making it easy for an adversary
trying to attack.
An alternative key distribution scheme is fully pairwise keys scheme, i.e., every node in the
sensor network shares a distinct key with every other node in the network. The main problem
with this pairwise key scheme is its poor scalability. The number of keys that must be stored in
each node is proportional to the total number of nodes in the network. Since sensor nodes are
resource-constrained, this brings signiﬁcant overhead which limits the scheme’s applicability
except for it can only be eﬀectively used in smaller networks.
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In sensor networks, we can use a trusted, secure base station as an arbiter to provide link keys
to sensor nodes. The sensor nodes authenticate themselves to the base station, after which
the base station generates a link key and sends it to both parties securely. An example of
such a protocol is SNEP, a part of the SPINS security infrastructure [56]. However, this kind
of schemes suﬀers high energy consumption, which makes it inapplicable in most of sensor
network applications.
2.2 Schemes based on Initial Trust Model
In LEAP [79], Zhu, Setia, and Jajodia proposed a key distribution scheme based on initial
trust mode. Every node shares a common master key K and a keyed one-way hash function H.
Upon deployed, nodes begin to discover all neighbor nodes and establish pairwise key using K
and H. For example, the pairwise key between node u and v can be HHK(u)(v) or HK(u||v).
After establishing every pairwise key, all nodes eliminate the master key. LEAP assumes
that T (the time necessary for an adversary to compromise a sensor node) is larger than the
maximum time for nodes to complete the key distribution. If this assumption holds, LEAP
is secure. However, sensors may be deployed in diﬀerent phases, and new sensors need to be
added when previously deployed sensors fail or when the capability of the existing network
is turned to be insuﬃcient. A major disadvantage of LEAP is not supporting multi-phase
deployment—new nodes cannot create pairwise keys with previous nodes.
Proposal in [22] partially solves this problem by that there are many distinct master keys,
each of which is for one phase. Every node u in phase i stores the master key Ki and all
other HKj(u),where j > i. Every two adjacent nodes in same phase can establish pairwise
key like LEAP. If node u in phase i and node v in phase j want to establish pairwise key,
supposing i < j, they both can compute HHKj(u)(v) and get the pairwise key. Every node
only eliminates its phase mater key, and keeps the rest. A drawback of this scheme steps
up that an adversary who comprises one node can duplicate many nodes which can establish
pairwise keys with later phase nodes. And the number of phases has to be determined prior
to ﬁrst deployment.
Another initial-trust-like scheme is addressed in [3], and is further enhanced in [35]. They
assume that adversaries can monitor only small portion of sensor nodes, due to randomly
deployment of sensor networks. Initially, each pair of neighbor nodes only broadcast their
pairwise key in plaintext. Afterwards, they can utilize multihop and multipath indirect secure
links to exchange other secret data, which results in higher security.
2.3 Basic Random Probabilistic Key Distribution Scheme
Eschenauer and Gligor [27] ﬁrst proposed random key probabilistic distribution schemes (EG
scheme) based on random graph theory [63]. A random graph is a graph that is generated
by starting with a set of n vertices and adding edges between them at random. In Erd¨ os-
R´ enyi model, a random graph is denoted by G(n,p), in which every possible edge occurs
independently with probability p. Erd¨ os and R´ enyi [26] showed that, to achieve almost one
hundred percent graph connectivity, every two vertices only need to have relatively lower
probability P0 of existence of direct link. More than often, sensor node are randomly deployed,
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network as a graph, nodes as vertices, and links as edges. Using random graph theory, we
can theoretically analyze the connectivity of sensor networks and design WSN-speciﬁc security
protocols. Since EG scheme, the random probabilistic approaches are gaining many attentions
in secure wireless sensor networks, and many interesting protocols are proposed. Pietro et
al. [57] questioned the realistic assumption of random graph model in WSNs, and proposed
another geometric random model for WSNs. Wu and Stinson [72] further discussed these
models and validated the use of the random graph model in computing the connectivity of
WSNs. Nevertheless, random-graph-based analyses are still prevailing in protocols of WSNs.
EG scheme works as follows.
(1) Key initialization stage. Let m denote the number of distinct cryptographic keys that
can be stored on a sensor node. Before sensor nodes are deployed, an oﬄine trusted key
distribution server generates a key pool of S random keys out of a total possible key space.
For each node, m keys are randomly selected from the key pool and loaded into the node’s
memory. This set of m keys is called the node’s key ring. The number of keys in the key
pool, S, is determined satisfying that two random subsets of size m in S will share at least
one key with probability p such that the whole network can achieve almost fully connectivity
probability Pc.
(2) Directly shared key discovery stage. After deployment, each node tries to discover its
neighbors with which it shares common keys. There are many ways to determine whether
two nodes share common keys or not. The simplest way is to make the nodes broadcast
their key identity lists to other nodes. If a node ﬁnds out that it shares at least a common
key with a neighborhood node, it can use the ﬁrst common key for secure communication.
Alternatively, the set of keys in the key ring of a node could be bound with the node’s ID
via a pseudorandom function. In this case, each node only needs to broadcast its ID to its
neighbors.
(3) Path key establishment stage: A link exists between two nodes only if they share a key,
but the path key establishment stage facilitates provision of the link between two nodes when
they do not share a common key. Nodes can set up path keys with nodes in their vicinity
that they did not happen to share keys with in their key rings. If the graph is connected, a
path can be found from a source node to its neighbor. The source node can then generate a
path key and send it securely via the path to the target node.
2.4 Enhancement of Random Key Distribution
Chan, Perrig, and Song [13] introduced two variations of EG Scheme, i.e., q-composite random
key predistribution and multipath key reinforcement. The q-composite random key predistri-
bution scheme requires that two nodes have at least q common keys to set up a link and use
all common keys instead of ﬁrst one to establish pairwise key. As the number of key overlap
between two nodes increases, it becomes harder for an adversary to break their communica-
tion link. At the same time, to maintain the probability that two nodes establish a link with q
common keys, it is necessary to reduce the size of the key pool, which poses a possible security
breach in the network as the adversary now has to compromise only a few nodes to gain a
large portion of key pool. Therefore the challenge of the q-composite scheme is to choose an
optimal value for q while ensuring that security is not sacriﬁced. However, the optimal value
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and cannot be precisely determined while network parameters are designated. Therefore, the
beneﬁt of q-composite (q > 1) mode might be trivial. The multipath reinforcement scheme
is similar to [3], using multipath indirect secure link to exchange secret data to oﬀer good se-
curity with additional communication overhead, suitable for occasions where security is more
of a concern than bandwidth or power drain.
Liu, Ning and Li [49] proposed a key predistribution scheme which combines EG scheme
with polynomial-based key predistribution protocol in [8]. During the key initialization
stage, setup server generates a set of bivariate t-degree symmetric polynomials fl(x,y) = Pt
i,j=0 aijxiyj, where aij = aji,l ∈ [0,S − 1] over a ﬁnite ﬁeld Fq. For each node u, a sub-
set of these polynomials are then picked up by the server and all f(u,y) are computed and
placed in the node u. In the key discovery stage sensor node u ﬁnds every adjacent node,
e.g. node v, with which it shares the same original bivariate polynomial and then both nodes
can establish a common pairwise key, because f(u,v) = f(v,u). Du et al. [20] independently
discovered a technique which is equivalent to Liu-Ning-Li’s scheme. Huang et al. [33] further
analyzed the performance of polynomial-based key predistribution scheme. In general, the
security performance of this kind of scheme overweighs that of original EG scheme. On the
other hand, it has to be noticed that operations in those schemes are in ﬁnite ﬁeld Fq, where q
is necessary to be the minimal prime integer greater than the length of secret key k, typically
2128. Sometimes the costly ﬁnite ﬁeld operations may be not very suitable for some extremely
resource-constrained sensor nodes.
In general, sensor nodes are randomly scattered into targeted area, thus it is diﬃcult to
obtain deployment knowledge of nodes. As a matter of fact, it is a general assumption for
characteristic of sensor networks. However, some proposals argued that some information on
deployment knowledge is achievable if the deployment of nodes follows some particular pattern.
For example, if sensor nodes are scattered by an airplane, these nodes might be grouped or
placed in a particular order before deployment and, based on this pattern, an approximate
knowledge of node positions can be acquired. In these scenarios, combined with random key
distribution scheme, several schemes were proposed. Those nodes which are more likely to
become neighbors are allocated more same source material such that bigger size of key pool
still suﬃce to maintain the same connectivity of global network, which strengthen resistance
against node capture. The major issue in those schemes is how to develop suitable node
deployment models. Deployment knowledge in [48] is modeled using non-uniform probability
density functions (pdfs), which assumes the positions of sensor nodes to be at certain areas.
Generally nodes are deployed in groups; therefore the pdfs of the ﬁnal resident points of all
the sensors in a group is highly likely to be the same as the group of sensors deployed in a
single deployment point. Other models are addressed in [21, 16]. A reasonable doubt to those
schemes is whether or how precisely their models reﬂect the true node deployment.
Traynor et al. [65] proposed a random key distribution scheme based on the heterogeneous
sensor network model. Instead of a homogeneous composition of nodes, this kind of network
now consists of a mix of nodes with diﬀerent capabilities and missions. Level 1 (L1) nodes
are assumed to be very limited in terms of memory and processing capability and perform
the task of data collection. Level 2 (L2) nodes have more memory, processing ability, and
additional radios (e.g., 802.11). These nodes are equipped with additional keys and take on
the role of routers and gateways between networks. In addition to tamper-resistant casings,
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their supplementary keys from compromise if they are captured. Under this assumption, a
scheme for the unbalanced distribution of keys throughout a wireless sensor network builds
upon the EG scheme. Intuitively, with more powerful nodes in a sensor network, it deﬁnitely
can achieve better security
2.5 Key Distribution Using Combinatorial Design
C ¸amtepe and Yener [10] ﬁrst proposed deterministic methods using combinatorial design in
key distribution of wireless sensor networks. They showed how to map from two classes of
combinatorial designs— balanced incomplete block designs and generalized quadrangles—to
obtain deterministic key distribution schemes. Chakrabarti, Maitra, and Roy [11] presented
a randomized block merging strategy for key pre-distribution in WSNs. Wei and Wu [69]
provided two key predistribution schemes using diﬀerence families and all k-subsets of a set.
Lee and Stinson [45] discussed how to employ two types of transversal designs, the set of
all linear polynomials and the set of quadratic polynomials, to improve the performance of
key predistribution schemes by carefully choosing a certain class of set systems as “key ring
spaces”.
2.6 Group Key Distribution
Wireless sensor networks are inherently collaborative environments in which sensor nodes
often communicate in groups that typically are dynamic. Eﬃcient group key management
schemes are demanded for secure communications under this collaborative model. General
speaking, many traditional binary-tree-based group key management schemes and broad-
cast approaches, such as logical key hierarchy, one-way function chain tree, and subset-cover
broadcast encryption, can be adapted into wireless sensor networks. Currently many pro-
posed group key management schemes in WSNs are based on exclusion basis systems (EBS),
presented by Eltoweissy et al. [23], which is a combinatorial formulation of the group key
management problem that produces optimal results with respect to the parameters n, k and
m, where n is the size of the group, k is the number of keys stored by each member, and m
is the exact number of re-key messages to exclude one member. It is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 1 (Exclusion Basis System) Let n, k and m be positive integers, where 1 <
k,m < n. An Exclusion Basis System of dimension (n,k,m), denoted by EBS(n,k,m), is
a collection Γ of subsets of [1,n] such that for every integer t ∈ [1,n], the following two
properties hold:
(a) t is in at most k subsets of Γ
(b) There are exactly m subsets, say A1,A2,...,Am, in Γ such that
Sm
i=1 Ai. is [1,n]−{t}.
(That is, each element t can be excluded by a union of exactly m subsets in Γ)
In a collusion-free environment, using EBS for key management guarantees forward and
backward secrecy. Eltoweissy et al. [23] proved that there exists a positive solution to the
EBS(n,k,m) problem, where k + m is equal to the total number of keys, if and only if
C(k+m,k) ≥ n. Apparently, we can tradeoﬀ between the number of re-key messages and the
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large numbers of users, n, there are systems satisfying the properties of EBS(n,k,m) with k
and m smaller than the corresponding values of k and m for a binary tree system. However
binary-tree-based approaches ensure that collusion between users is not possible, whereas an
arbitrary EBS needs an external technique to safeguard security through collusion attacks.
Eltoweissy et al. [25, 24] applied EBS to sensor networks using speciﬁc network models.
In GKIP [25], all sensor nodes in the network are anonymous and are preloaded with identical
state information. The proposed scheme leverages a location-based virtual network infrastruc-
ture, combined with EBS. GKIP implements group keys at the granularity of a set of nodes.
The set granularity allows for an eﬃcient peer monitoring mechanism within a particular set
that enables detecting nodes that inﬁltrate the network or exhibit suspicious behavior. LOCK
[24], localized combinatorial keying, is another dynamic key management scheme based on
the EBS scheme. The assumed network model consists of a three level hierarchy, i.e., base
station, cluster heads, and sensor nodes. LOCK does not use location information in the
generation of keys. When the nodes are initially released into the environment, they create a
set of backup keys. These sets of backup keys are only shared with the base station, not the
local cluster leader nodes. If a node is captured, other nodes are rekeyed locally so that the
compromised node is unable to communicate with them. If a cluster leader is compromised,
the base station initiates a rekeying on at the cluster head level. Also, nodes within the group
governed by the compromised cluster leader rekey with the base station. In LOCK, if an
adversary compromises any node, it does not have any eﬀect on the operations of other nodes
in other clusters.
In order to reduces the potential of collusion among compromised sensor nodes in standard
EBS system, Younis, Ghumman, and Eltoweissy [25] proposed SHELL scheme , using node
location information to compute keys with the help of clusters and gateways. SHELL gathers
node locations after employment and uses this information for assigning keys. Nodes that are
located closer to each other share a higher number of keys than nodes that are located longer
distance from each other. The clusters in this scheme track key assignments but not the keys
themselves. The actual keys are stored in the gateways of other clusters. SHELL exploits the
physical proximity of nodes so that a node would share most keys with reachable nodes, and
thus very few additional keys would be revealed when colluding.
2.7 Public Key Feasibility
The common perception of public key cryptography is that it is complex, slow, power hungry,
and not at all suitable for use in ultra-low power environments like wireless sensor networks.
Gaubatz, Kaps and Sunar [30] ﬁrst challenged the basic assertion of public key cryptography
infeasibility in sensor networks, which are based on a traditional software based approach.
They propose a custom hardware assisted approach for which they claim that it makes public
key cryptography available in such environments, provided they use the right selection of
algorithms and associated parameters, careful optimization, and low-power design techniques.
In the family of public key algorithms, Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC) and Hyper
Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (HECC) are widely thought of as the best balance in terms of
speed, memory requirement and security level. Malan, Welsh, and Smith [51] presented the
ﬁrst implementation of elliptic curve cryptography over GF(2p) for sensor networks based on
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impractical, they argue, through analysis of their implementation for TinyOS of multiplication
of points on elliptic curves, that public-key infrastructure is, in fact, viable for sensor network
key distribution, even on the MICA2. They demonstrate that public keys can be generated
within 34 seconds and that shared secrets can be distributed among nodes in a sensor network
within the same, using just over 1 kilobyte of SRAM and 34 kilobytes of ROM.
Bertoni, Breveglieri, and Venturi [7] proposed two coprocessor architectures suitable for
sensor networks: a 12K gate processor able to perform one k ∗ P operation (i.e., the ECC
primitive) over the ﬁnite ﬁeld GF(2163) in 17.05ms, consuming 1.1mJ of energy, and a 18.5K
gate coprocessor performing the same operation in 14.68ms but consuming only 0.66mJ.
Doyle et al. [19] examined the practicality of using eﬃcient elliptic curve algorithms and
identity-based encryption to deploy a secure sensor network infrastructure. They evaluated
the potential for realizing this on low-power, long-life devices by measuring power consump-
tion of the operations needed for key management in a sensor network and provided further
evidence for the feasibility of the approach. However, their platform based on ARM7TDMI
processor is considerably more powerful than any of the devices that are used in WSNs at the
moment.
The applicable implementation of public-key crytography in typical sensor nodes platform
comes with TinyECC [46], NanoECC [64], and TinyPBC [53]. TinyECC is very useful since it
is a conﬁgurable library for ECC operations in wireless sensor networks. TinyECC provides a
number of optimization switches, which can turn speciﬁc optimizations on or oﬀ according to
developers’ needs. Diﬀerent combinations of the optimizations cost diﬀerent execution time
and resource consumptions, giving developers great ﬂexibility in integrating TinyECC into
sensor network applications. Liu and Ning presented the design, implementation, and eval-
uation of TinyECC on several common sensor platforms, including MICAz, Tmote Sky, and
Imote2 in [46]. In NanoECC [64], point multiplication in a curve takes 1.27s at 7.3828MHz on
MICA2 mote. Pairing-based cryptography (PBC) is an emerging ﬁeld related to ECC which
has been attracting the interest of international cryptography community, since it enables
the design of original cryptographic schemes (such as, identity-base encryption) and makes
well-known cryptographic protocols more eﬃcient. TinyPBC is able to compute pairings, the
PBC primitive, in about 5.5s on an ATmega128L clocked at 7.3828-MHz. Although it appears
not very good, it does show the applicability of pairing-based cryptography in WSNs.
2.8 Discussion
Random key distribution approaches are prevailing at present. However, few analyses about
communication overload in these schemes have been conducted. Especially, ﬁnding a secure
path in a random graph is a NP-complete problem. Most of those schemes just ignored
this problem. Rekey and perfect backward secrecy are also serious issues for those random
predistribution schemes. From the practical point of view, group key distribution and public
key based might be the tendency. The progress in eﬃciently implementation of ECC and
HECC and advances in sensor hardware will make public key cryptosystem practicable in a
few years.
103 Attacks and Countermeasures
Like any wireless ad hoc network, WSNs are suﬀering many diﬀerent attacks. In this section,
we introduce the major attacks to WSNs and countermeasures.
3.1 Secure Routing
Routing is a basic functionality of any network, there are various attacks and corresponding
countermeasures for WSNs. Sybil attack and wormhole attack are two major routing attacks
speciﬁcally for WSNs.
Karlof and Wagner [41] ﬁrst considered routing security in wireless sensor networks sys-
tematically. They addressed security goals for routing in sensor networks, showed how attacks
against ad-hoc and peer-to-peer networks can be adapted into powerful attacks against sensor
networks, introduced two classes of novel attacks against sensor networks — sinkholes and
HELLO ﬂoods, and analyzed the security of all major sensor network routing protocols. Sink
is an alias of base station in sensor networks. In a sinkhole attack, the adversary’s goal is
to lure nearly all the traﬃc from a particular area through a compromised node, creating
a metaphorical sinkhole with the adversary at the center. Because nodes along or near the
path that packets follow have many opportunities to tamper with application data, sinkhole
attacks can enable many other attacks. They also described crippling attacks against all of
them and suggest countermeasures and design considerations.
Sybil Attack:
Sybil attack is a harmful threat to sensor networks, in which a malicious node illegally
forges an unbounded number of identities. The Sybil attack can disrupt normal functioning
of the sensor network, such as the multipath routing, used to explore the multiple disjoint
paths between source-destination pairs. Douceur [18] ﬁrst presented the Sybil attack problem
in the peer-to-peer distributed systems. He pointed out that it could defeat the redundancy
mechanisms of the distributed storage systems. Newsome et al. [52] analyzed the threat posed
by the Sybil attack to wireless sensor networks. They established a classiﬁcation of diﬀerent
types of the Sybil attack, proposed several techniques to defend against the Sybil attack, and
analyzed their eﬀectiveness quantitatively.
Zhang et al. [77] proposed a light-weight identity certiﬁcate method using to thwart Sybil
attack. This method uses a two-level Merkle hash tree to create certiﬁcates. Each sensor
node is pre-assigned a unique secret key to derive one-way key chains. An identity certiﬁcate
is also distributed to each node, which associates the node’s identity with its one-way key
chain. To securely demonstrate its identity, a node ﬁrst presents its identity certiﬁcate, and
then proves that it possesses or matches the associated unique information. An extension of
this method exploits node deployment knowledge to reduce the computational overhead at
each node. However, the scalability problem of this method adversely aﬀects its use in a large
scale sensor network.
Yin and Madria [75] proposed a light-weight Sybil attack detection method based on a
hierarchical architecture in sensor networks. This method also uses a two-level Merkle hash
tree to create certiﬁcates. A high-level certiﬁcate allows a node’s identity to be proved to other
nodes that it needs to communicate with. A node creating a false identity will not be able to
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match commitment, which is publicly known, according to the properties of the Merkle hash
tree. The low-level identity certiﬁcate makes this proof speciﬁc to a single receiving node.
Wormhole Attack:
Since sensors use a radio channel to send information, malicious nodes can eavesdrop the
packets, tunnel them to another location in the network, and retransmit them. This gener-
ates a false scenario that the original sender is in the neighborhood of the remote location.
The tunneling procedure forms a wormhole attack. In [68], Wang and Bhargava proposed a
mechanism, MDS-VOW, to detect wormholes in a sensor network. MDS-VOW ﬁrst recon-
structs the layout of the sensors using multi-dimensional scaling. Then MDS-VOW detects
the wormhole by visualizing the anomalies introduced by the attack. The anomalies, which
are caused by the fake connections through the wormhole, bend the reconstructed surface
to pull the sensors that are faraway to each other. Through detecting the bending feature,
the wormhole is located and the fake connections are identiﬁed. Yun et al. [76] proposed
another countermeasure named WODEM against the wormhole attack. In WODEM, a few
detector nodes equipped with location-aware devices and longer-lasting batteries detect worm-
holes, and normal sensor nodes are only required to forward control packets from the detector
nodes. Then a pair of detectors can detect the wormhole attack between them.
3.2 DoS Attack
Denial of service (DoS) attack is a pervasive threat to most networks. Due to the charac-
teristics of energy-sensitiveness and resource-limitedness, sensor networks are very vulnerable
for DoS attack. Wood and Stankovic [71] explored various DoS attacks that may happen in
every network layers of sensor networks. In [43], Mihui, Inshil, and Kijoon proposed a DoS
detection method via practical entropy estimation on hierarchical sensor networks reﬂecting
resource constraints of sensors. In order to enhance the accuracy of detection even in the var-
ious deployments of attack agents, they deployed hierarchically entropy estimators according
to network topology, and a main estimator synthesizes localized computation. This entropy
estimator is simpliﬁed by only multiplication calculation instead of logarithm, in addition
to providing higher estimation precision of entropy compared to the conventional entropy
estimation.
3.3 Node Clone Attack
Sensor nodes deployed in hostile environments are vulnerable to capture and compromise. An
adversary may extract secret information from these sensors, clone and intelligently deploy
them in the network to launch a variety of insider attacks. Chan and Perrig [12] catalog a
number of attacks that can be made using replicated nodes .
Parno, Perrig, and Gligor [54] provided two probabilistic algorithms to detect node clone.
They assume that every node is aware of it’s geographic coordinates location and broadcasts
the information to speciﬁc witnesses. Randomized multicast distributes node location infor-
mation to randomly-selected witnesses, exploiting the birthday paradox to detect replicated
nodes, while line-selected multicast uses the topology of the network to detect replication, i.e.,
12in addition to witness nodes, the nodes within the multicast path check the node replication.
Apparently, both of them are very communication-consuming.
SET proposed by Choi, Zhu, and Porta [15] is to detect node replication by computing set
operations (intersection and union) of exclusive subsets in the network. First, SET securely
forms exclusive unit subsets among one-hop neighbors in the network in a distributed way.
This secure subset formation also provides the authentication of nodes’ subset membership.
SET then employs a tree structure to compute non-overlapped set operations and integrates
interleaved authentication to prevent unauthorized falsiﬁcation of subset information during
forwarding. Randomization is used to further make the exclusive subset and tree formation
unpredictable to an adversary.
Brooks et al. [9] propose a clone detection protocol in the context of random key predis-
tribution (Section 2.3). The basic idea is that keys that are present on the cloned nodes are
detected by looking at how often they are used to authenticate nodes in the network. First
each node makes a counting Bloom ﬁlter of the keys it uses to communicate with neighboring
nodes and appends a nonce. Then Bloom ﬁlter and nonce are transferred to base station,
which will count the number of times each key is used in the network. Keys used above a
threshold value are considered cloned.
Bekara and Laurent-Maknavicius [5] describe a deterministic node clone detection protocol
based on the initial trust assumption (Section 2.2). They also suppose that nodes are not
mobile. Therefore cloned nodes of former generations can not request for key establishment.
3.4 General Intrusion Detection and Intrusion Tolerance
Agah et al. [1] proposed an intrusion detection framework of sensor networks using game
theory. They applied three diﬀerent schemes for defense. The main concern in all three
schemes is ﬁnding the most vulnerable node in a sensor network and protecting it. In the ﬁrst
scheme they formulated attack-defense problem as a two-player, nonzero-sum, non-cooperative
game between an attacker and a sensor network. This game achieves Nash equilibrium [1] and
thus leading to a defense strategy for the network. In the second scheme they used Markov
Decision Process to predict the most vulnerable senor node. In the third scheme they used an
intuitive metric (node’s traﬃc) and protected the node with the highest value of this metric.
Based on the DESERT tool, which has been proposed for component-based software ar-
chitectures, Inverardi, Mostarda, and Navarra [36] derived a framework that permits to dy-
namically enforce a set of properties of the sensors behavior. This is accomplished by an IDS
speciﬁcation that is automatically translated into few lines of code installed in the sensors.
This realizes a distributed system that locally detects violation of the sensors interactions poli-
cies and is able to minimize the information sent among sensors in order to discover attacks
over the network.
Deng, Han, and Mishra [17] described an INtrusion-tolerant routing protocol for wireless
SEnsor NetworkS (INSENS). INSENS constructs forwarding tables at each node to facilitate
communication between sensor nodes and a base station. It decreases computation, commu-
nication, storage, and bandwidth requirements at the sensor nodes at the expense of increased
computation, communication, storage, and bandwidth requirements at the base station. An
important property of INSENS is that while a malicious node may be able to compromise a
small number of nodes in its vicinity, it cannot cause widespread damage in the network.
133.5 Discussion
The attacks, detection, tolerance and countermeasures are highly application-speciﬁc. To
eﬀectively resist and detect those attacks, security consideration must be taken in account
in various protocols in sensor networks from scratch. Many current security protocols have
good performance to resist those attacks. For instance, in [78], the authors demonstrated
the eﬃcacy of their LBKs scheme in counteracting several notorious attacks against sensor
networks such as the Sybil attack, the identity replication attack, and wormhole and sinkhole
attacks.
Time synchronization and sensor location are very important in many sensor network
applications. There are considerable schemes regarding secure time synchronization and se-
cure localization in wireless sensor networks. Most of them, however, are not cryptographic
approaches. Many schemes in these two topics are discussed in [58].
4 Authentication
Authentication is one of the most important security primitives. Simply speaking, authentica-
tion is a mechanism by which some means is provided to guarantee that entities are who they
claim to be, or that information has not been manipulated by unauthorized parties. In fact,
authentication is speciﬁc to the security objective which one is trying to achieve. Examples of
speciﬁc objectives are message authentication (data origin authentication), entity authentica-
tion (identiﬁcation), access control, data integrity, non-repudiation, and key authentication.
In this section, we cover two principal categories of authentication in wireless sensor networks,
broadcast message authentication and entity authentication.
4.1 Broadcast Message Authentication
A broadcast message authentication scheme permits any targeted node to verify the authen-
ticity of the source of broadcasted messages. This can be achieved using digital signatures
if public key cryptography is used, or if only symmetric cryptography is used, by appending
veriﬁable authentication data, consisting of multiple shared-secrets based message authenti-
cation codes (MAC). Due to the properties of sensor networks, broadcast authentication is
more pervasive than one-to-one message authentication, and there are a number of schemes
to achieve broad authentication in sensor networks.
µTESLA, proposed by Perrig et al. [56], is the “micro” version of TESLA (Timed Eﬃ-
cient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication) [55]. It emulates asymmetry through a delayed
disclosure of symmetric keys and serves as the broadcast authentication service of SNEP[56].
µTESLA requires that the base station and the nodes are loosely time synchronized, and that
all nodes know an upper bound on the maximum synchronization error. For an authenticated
packet to be sent, the base station computes a MAC on the packet with the key that is secret
at that point of time. When a node receives a packet, it can conﬁrm that the base station
has not yet disclosed the corresponding MAC key, according to its loosely synchronized clock,
maximum synchronization error and the time at which the keys are to be disclosed. The node
stores the packet in its buﬀer. When the keys are to be disclosed, the base station broad-
casts the key to all receivers. Each MAC key is a member of a key chain, which has been
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the last key Kn of the chain randomly, and applies F repeatedly to compute all other keys:
Ki = F(Ki+1),i ∈ [1,n − 1]. The nodes can then verify the correctness of the key and use it
to authenticate the packet stored in the buﬀer.
Liu and Ning [47] presented a series of techniques to extend the capabilities of µTESLA.
The basic idea is to predetermine and broadcast the initial parameters required by µTESLA
instead of unicast-based message transmission. In the simplest form, this extension distributes
the µTESLA parameters during the initialization of the sensor nodes. To provide more ﬂexi-
bility, especially to prolong the lifetime of µTESLA without requiring a very long key chain,
they introduced a multi-level key chain scheme, in which the higher-level key chains are used
to authenticate the commitments of lower-level ones. To further improve the survivability of
the scheme against message loss and DoS attacks, they used redundant message transmissions
and random selection strategies to deal with the messages that distribute key chain commit-
ments. The resulting scheme, which is named multi-level µTESLA, removes the requirement
of unicast-based initial communication between base station and sensor nodes while keep-
ing the nice properties of µTESLA. µTESLA is also extended by Liu et al. [50] to support
multiuser scenario but the scheme assumes that each sensor node only interacts with a very
limited number of users.
Schemes based on delayed key disclosure, like µTESLA, can suﬀer from DoS attack. In the
subsequent interval when the message is in the buﬀer and the receiver waits on the disclosure
time, an attacker can ﬂood the network with arbitrary messages, claiming that they belong to
the current time interval. Only in the next time interval can the nodes determine that these
messages are not authentic. The use of public key cryptography would eliminate the need for
such complicated protocols, increasing the security of the system and only requiring the public
key of the base station to be embedded into all of nodes. Ren, et al. [61, 60] presented several
public-key-based schemes to achieve immediate broadcast authentication and thus avoid the
security vulnerability intrinsic to µTESLA-like schemes. Those schemes are built upon the
unique integration of several cryptographic techniques, including the Bloom ﬁlter, the partial
message recovery signature scheme and the Merkle hash tree.
Kondratieva and Seo [44] studied the problem of optimizing the authentication tree struc-
ture for sensor network environments. The procedure for ﬁnding the tree structure is for-
malized, in which the number of nodes with the longest authentication path length is made
minimal. An algorithm for hash tree generation is introduced and it is proven that the pro-
posed tree structure is optimal. Optimization of the authentication procedure is achieved by
proposing an indexing scheme, supported by the least path protocol.
µTESLA-family is interesting and can be applied to some WSN application area. How-
ever, as public-key primitives become more and more feasible in WSNs, most WSNs would
employ asymmetric approaches. The performance of current public-key-based broadcast au-
thentication is far from satisfaction, and more researches are demanded.
4.2 Entity Authentication
Access control is a classical problem in many existing computer systems and applications. To
achieve access control in wireless sensor networks, it is essential to authenticate the identities
of users.
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cryptography, utilizing redundancy to withstand node capture. They used the public key
infrastructure approach to issue a certiﬁcate for every user of the sensor networks through
a certiﬁcation authority (CA)and the CA has its own private/public key pair. A legitimate
User’s certiﬁcate is the user’s public key signed by the CA. Each sensor node in WSN has the
public key of the CA preloaded with which the node can verify the user’s certiﬁcate. Then
the user and the requested sensor node can carry out a standard challenge-response scheme
with digital signature. But their scheme is designed for only one sensor node to authenticate
the user, not the whole wireless sensor networks. And their scheme requires more overheads
for encryption and signature veriﬁcation than decryption and signing which makes a heavy
burden for the WSN.
Jiang and Xu [39] presented a distributed entity authentication scheme in wireless sensor
networks. It is based on the self-certiﬁed keys cryptosystem, which is modiﬁed to use elliptic
curve cryptography to establish pair-wise keys for use in the user authentication scheme.
Wong et al. [70] proposed a dynamic strong-password based entity authentication scheme
for wireless sensor networks. It allows legitimate users to query sensor data at any of the
sensor nodes in an ad hoc manner, and imposes low computational overload and requires only
simple operations, such as one-way hash function and exclusive-OR operations. Tseng, Jan,
and Wang [67] enhanced Wong et al.’s scheme to resist the replay and forgery attacks. It also
allows legitimate users to choose and change their passwords freely.
Tripathy and Nandi [66] used cellular automata based components to achieve entity au-
thentication. Cellular automata is a dynamic system consists of a grid of identical ﬁnite state
machines, whose states are updated synchronously at discrete time steps according to a local
update rule. The proposed security component is to achieve threshold authentication and
group key establishment as a suitable alternate to countermeasure the node capture attacks.
Information are distributed among several nodes and user can determine the correct answer
only if at least some certain correct responses are obtained.
All of these schemes above are based on conventional cryptography, symmetric or public-
key. In fact, if this kind of cryptographic primitives are allowed, there are plenty of general
entity authentication schemes that can be applied to sensor networks. The main issue left
is how to distribute and manage secret-keys, passwords, public-key certiﬁcate eﬀectively and
eﬃciently in the environment of sensor networks. Some ultra-light entity authentication may
be very useful in some wireless sensor networks.
5 Secure Data Aggregation
In many applications of wireless sensor networks, the base station is more interested in ag-
gregated data than exact individual values from all sensors. By aggregating data, it is also
greatly helpful to reduce the amount of data to be transmitted for conserving valuable en-
ergy. Indeed, current in-network aggregation schemes are beneﬁcial to communication energy
consumption but they are designed without considering possible security issues. Further-
more, wireless sensor networks are often designed with neighbor nodes sharing keys or with
decryption at aggregator nodes. In either situation the potential for aggregator nodes to be
physically compromised means that data conﬁdentiality is at high risk. Therefore secure data
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aggregator nodes. Aggregation becomes especially challenging if end-to-end conﬁdentiality
between a source and a destination is required.
Hu and Evans [32] proposed a secure hop-by-hop data aggregation scheme. In their scheme,
individual packets are aggregated in some pattern so that the base station can detect non-
authorized inputs. On the other hand, their solution introduces a considerable communication
overhead per packet. Moreover, they assumed that only leaf nodes under a tree-like network
topology sense data, whereas the intermediate nodes do not have their own data readings,
which is a little unrealistic, or at least too restricted. Jadia and Muthuria [37] extended the
Hu-Evans scheme. Instead of relying on keys shared between the base station and sensor
nodes for authentication, Jadia-Muthuria scheme make use of one-hop as well as two-hop
pairwise keys. It is intended to replace the data validation step of the Hu-Evans scheme with
some other mechanism that does not require unnecessary key reception by all nodes. Those
two schemes are resistent to only a single inside malicious node and outside intruder devices.
Yang, et al. [74] proposed SDAP, a secure hop-by-hop data aggregation protocol for
sensor networks, using the principles of divide-and-conquer and commitand-attest. In SDAP,
a novel probabilistic grouping technique is utilized to dynamically partition the nodes in a tree
topology into subtrees. A commitment-based hop-by-hop aggregation is conducted in each
subtree to generate a group aggregate. The base station identiﬁes the suspicious subtrees
based on the set of group aggregates. Finally, each subtree under suspect participates in an
attestation procedure to prove the correctness of its group aggregate. Feng et al. [28] proposed
a family of secret perturbation-based schemes that protect sensed information conﬁdentiality
without disrupting the data aggregation.
Several secure aggregation algorithms have been proposed under the scenario that there
are a certain class of nodes called aggregators. Przydatek, Song, and Perrig [59] proposed
secure information aggregation (SIA) to identify forged aggregation values from all sensor
nodes in a network. In SIA scheme, aggregators compute an aggregation result over the raw
data together with a commitment to the data based on a Merkle-hash tree and send data to
a trustable remote user, who later challenges the aggregators to verify the aggregation. They
assumed that the bandwidth between a remote user and aggregators is a bottleneck in this
scenario. Therefore the SIA scheme is intended to reduce this communication overhead while
providing a mechanism to detect with high probability if aggregators are compromised.
Homomorphic encryption [29] is semantically-secure encryption which, in addition to stan-
dard guarantees, has additional properties, e.g. the sum of any two encrypted values is equal
to the encrypted sum of the values. There are several eﬃcient homomorphic cryptosystems,
such as Unpadded RSA, El-Gamal, Goldwasser-Micali, Benaloh and Paillier [29]. Using ho-
momorphic encryption, Kifayat et al. [42] presented the extended structure and density
independent group based key management protocol (SADI-GKM) with the additional feature
of secure data aggregation to provide better data conﬁdentiality to every single node in a
large scale wireless sensor network. Ren, Kim, and Park [62] also proposed a secure data
aggregation scheme which supports end-to-end encryption using homomorphic encryption as
well as hop-by-hop veriﬁcation using ECC based MAC.
Current proposed secure data aggregation schemes are rather elementary and more practi-
cal schemes are demanded. It is worthwhile to pay more attention how to apply homomorphic
encryption to secure aggregation eﬀectively. In the meantime, it is of great help to focus on
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6 Privacy
One challenge threatening the successful deployment of sensor networks is privacy. Although
many privacy-related issues can be addressed by security mechanisms, one sensor network
privacy issue that cannot be adequately addressed by network security is source-location
privacy. Adversaries may use RF localization techniques to perform hop-by-hop traceback to
the source sensor’s location.
Kamat et al. [40] provided a formal model for the source-location privacy problem in sen-
sor networks and examined the privacy characteristics of diﬀerent sensor routing protocols.
They inspected two popular classes of routing protocols: ﬂooding-based routing protocols, and
the routing protocols involving only a single path from the source to the sink. While inves-
tigating the privacy performance of routing protocols, they considered the tradeoﬀs between
location-privacy and energy consumption. They argued that most of the current protocols
cannot provide eﬃcient source-location privacy while maintaining desirable system perfor-
mance. They devised new techniques to enhance source-location privacy that augment these
routing protocols. One of strategies, a technique called phantom routing, has been proven
ﬂexible and capable of protecting the source’s location, while not incurring a noticeable in-
crease in energy overhead. Further, they examined the eﬀect of source mobility on location
privacy. It is shown that even with the natural privacy ampliﬁcation resulting from source
mobility, the phantom routing techniques yield improved source-location privacy relative to
other routing methods.
The model of k-anonymity is one of major mechanisms in protecting privacy. Gedik and
Ling [31] described a personalized k-anonymity model for protecting location privacy against
various privacy threats through location information sharing. First, they provided a uniﬁed
privacy personalization framework to support location k-anonymity for a wide range of users
with context-sensitive personalized privacy requirements. This framework enables each mobile
node to specify the minimum level of anonymity it desires as well as the maximum temporal
and spatial resolutions it is willing to tolerate when requesting for k-anonymity preserving
location-based services (LBSs). Second, they devised an message perturbation engine which
runs by the location protection broker on a trusted server and performed location anonymity
on mobile users’ LBS request messages, such as identity removal and spatio-temporal cloaking
of location information. They developed a suite of spatio-temporal cloaking algorithms, called
Clique Cloak algorithms, to provide personalized location k-anonymity, intending to avoid or
reduce known location privacy threats before forwarding requests to LBS providers.
Jian et al. [38] proposed a location privacy routing protocol (LPR) that provides path di-
versity and protects receiver-location privacy in WSNs. Combining with fake packet injection,
LPR is able to minimize the traﬃc direction information that an adversary can retrieve from
eavesdropping. By making the directions of both incoming and outgoing traﬃc at a sensor
node uniformly distributed, this system makes it hard for an adversary to perform analysis
on locally gathered information and infer the direction to which the receiver locates.
187 Conclusion
As WSNs grow in application area and are used more frequently, the need for security in them
becomes inevitable and vital. However, the inherent characteristics of WSNs incur constraints
to of sensor nodes, such as limited energy, processing capability, and storage capacity, etc.
These constraints make WSNs very diﬀerent from traditional wireless networks. Consequently,
many innovative security protocols and techniques have been developed to meet this challenge.
In this paper, we outline security and privacy issues in sensor networks, address the state of
the art in sensor network security, and discuss some future directions for research.
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